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1954?

I. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP IDEA

Date 6/25/91

WRP 89-2

A. Concept (This is a [redacted] thesis---please attack)

CIG would have been no more nor less than a coordinating committee. It would not have (need not have) ~~established~~ <sup>become</sup> a group or agency, independent or quasi-independent.

Reasons: The acting entity (delegation of the President's authority) was the NIA, consisting of cabinet members who headed the principal establishments concerned with intelligence and which possessed intelligence facilities. They ~~provided~~ <sup>provided</sup> him with the departments and agencies. The Director reported to them. They provided him with assistants. Nothing new had been created. The Director had nothing of his own including funds. His job was that of general superintendent who was to take a national, as opposed to a departmental, view of intelligence for the purpose of bringing intelligence of national scope to the attention of those making national policy; and ensuring that such intelligence would never be withheld from any part of the government having a legitimate need for it. (No more Pearl Harbor). The Director's sole duties were (a) to recommend to the NIA when he ~~himself~~ had reason to believe that changes in any part of the intelligence structure would benefit the national interest; and (b) to settle disputes as between elements of the intelligence structure (with reference to the NIA if necessary.)

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Under this scheme, the Director did not collect intelligence. He evaluated that which was collected by through the intelligence system already in existence. (This being minus OSS which had been abolished, and SSU which was in a state of liquidation and temporarily part of the intelligence establishment of the War Department.) The Director's assistants, furnished him by the departments, were to help him in evaluating intelligence (from a national point of view) and distributing it properly under the terms of the ~~Emmick~~ President's letter. They were still part of their parent departments. Only the Director was "independent"; yet even he was, in effect, the servant of ~~them~~ these same departments in the persons of their Secretaries. The Director could also avail himself of the advice of the Chiefs of Intelligence of the same departments. Whether they actually advised or more nearly directed the Director is not of importance in this connection. The point is that the whole CIG idea was that of an interdepartmental committee with ~~authoritative chairman~~ a special chairman whose authority derived from the President through departmental heads. The only changes that had come about since before the war (aside from the wartime expansion of the intelligence structure in general) were the abolition of OSS, and the creation of a committee system whose purpose was to prevent the intelligence structure from settling back into its pre-

war compartmentalization

It would be hard to prove that this system could not have been effective.

If it had failed, the Director would have been responsible only to the extent that the failure could be ascribed to a lack of central coordination. A failure to collect required information would, of itself, been wholly the responsibility of the departmental collection structures. ~~Azttizunzproperly~~ A failure properly to evaluate the intelligence collected would have been more nearly the responsibility of the Director; yet the actual work of evaluation would have been done by persons appointed by, <sup>and</sup> under the control of the participating departments. Finally, since the Director was given no authority to do more than recommend, he could not be blamed where recommendations had not been taken.

## II. THE VANDENBERG CHANGES

The clause from the President's letter of 22 January 1946 (para. 3, a) stating that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security" is susceptible of more than one interpretation. As ~~maximum~~ it stands, ~~maximum~~, it does not necessarily mean that the Director must direct the production of ~~maximum~~ what are now called national intelligence estimates ~~for maximum~~ ~~(maximum)~~ to be used in the formation of national policy, for which he (or someone else) must take full responsibility in relation to the success or

failure of that policy. It called on him only to "correlate" (bring into mutual  
and disseminate (circulate.)  
relationship) and "evaluate" (place a value upon.) /No doubt, intelligence which  
had been correlated and evaluated, and had thus become "strategic and national  
policy intelligence" would have been disseminated "within the government" in a  
~~form~~ such a form that it would have been impossible to escape a resultant re-  
sponsibility which must rest somewhere. Yet it would not have been necessary for  
the Director of Central Intelligence to take this responsibility. He need have  
done no more than to make sure that his departmental assistants correlated and  
evaluated the intelligence they received; and that whatever might be the result of  
their correlated evaluations should be appropriately disseminated.

General Vandenberg did not take this view of this important clause in the  
Presidential directive. He considered that he, as Director, must, in the last  
analysis, present the National Intelligence Authority and the ~~President~~ President  
with "strategic and national policy intelligence" which would necessarily have a  
part in the formation of national policy, and that he, as Director, must personally  
take responsibility for it.

The implications in this view need not have been far-reaching. The Director  
could have accepted full responsibility under the system described above. He

would undoubtedly have been unwise to do so. General Vandenberg did not believe  
that he could take responsibility for the products of organization and evaluation correlated and evaluated products unless he had some control over correlation and evaluation.

Under the system ~~in force~~ gradually coming into force, he had to rely on a sort of committee, made up of the employees of others, who passed judgment on intelligence that had been partially correlated and evaluated before the committee received it.

He had no way of knowing if the information were complete or reliable except in so far as a committee, which he could not directly control, told him it was complete and reliable.

It was for this reason that he requested (and was granted) the power of "executive agent". But this power, like the clause of the Presidential Directive (para 5) that made the NIA agencies "open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence" depended on what use the Director made of it

Vandenberg made no use of it. Hillenkoetter dropped it.

Thus the ideas of executive agent and of inspection became mere elements of strategy. In gaining the executive power, Vandenberg had, in effect, announced that he did not believe he could discharge his duties unless he had a reasonable degree of authority with respect to the participating departments. Hillenkoetter started on the premise that he could. The point is academic. Neither tried to operate authoritatively.

More important is was Vandenberg's basic insistence that he could not rely upon sources of intelligence other than his own. This insistence is basic because it extends into practical application the theory that CIG is apart from rather than a part of the existing intelligence structure of the government. The terms of the directive that gave the CIG the power to undertake intelligence research are innocent. The principle involved is such that agreement to this directive changed the whole concept of central intelligence. For when it was agreed that CIG could build up files and retain experts of its own, the idea had been accepted that Central Intelligence could be potentially in position to operate independently of any part of the existing intelligence structure. Implicit in the idea, of course, was the right, acquired by Vandenberg, to ~~employ~~ to employ persons independent

independently and to pay them independently. Incidental to it was the power of independent internal and external collection of foreign intelligence. This further extended the concept of independence, making CIG, if need be, able to operate in complete disregard for the intelligence agencies it had been called upon originally to coordinate.

#### THE PERIOD OF INDECISION


General Vandenberg's reasoning might be summarized as follows:

- a. He must take responsibility for intelligence ~~formulation~~ to be used in the formation of national policy estimates
- b. He could not do so under a "CIG" ~~system~~ system because that system gave him no authority ~~exercising~~ with respect to the material on which ~~this~~ the estimates would be based
- c. Therefore he must have technical authority (something that would permit him to do more than request cooperation) and practical authority (the means of determining, rather than trusting, that the sources of his estimates were sound).

Admiral Hillenkoetter did not think the technical authority that his predecessor had gained was either necessary or desirable. He therefore renounced it.

He did nothing similar, however, regarding his practical authority, either because he did consider this desirable, or because no pressure was brought upon him to renounce it. Consequently, if he chose to act according to the general idea of an independent agency, as opposed to a coordinating committee, he would have to rely solely upon his ability to check upon the adequacy of the intelligence he received by the practical means at his command. The logical extension of this theory would be ~~xx~~ a central agency so completely independent that it could and would act in utter disregard of any other agency. But the laws were such that this could not quite legally happen.

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Of three possible developments of central intelligence, therefore, CIG/CIA found itself between 1947 and 1950 in the least tenable. For there might have been a coordinating group which would have taken no responsibility beyond those of coordination, which would have been a tenable position and might have worked well. Or there could have been a structure in which all parts would have been subordinate

to the DCI and under which the DCI would have taken full responsibility. This again would have been tenable and could theoretically have succeeded. The third position was one in which there grew up five intelligence agencies instead of where there had once been three. The idea of coordination was ruled out ~~whence~~ by the retention of independent research and independent finances. The idea of subordination was ruled out by the renunciation of authority. Nevertheless, (i.e. those regarding research and "common concern") there remained an agreement/under which the central agency could grow in any activity common to agencies engaged in the work of foreign intelligence.

#### B. ORGANIZATION OF THE "FIFTH" AGENCY

The type of organization under which the Group could have functioned would have been impossible for the fifth agency. Now the Director, in addition to the three assistants listed above, must have (a) assistants ~~for control of financial~~ to deal with administration, personnel, finances, ~~intelligence~~ law, medicine. The Assistant for correlation and evaluation became the head of a complete "processing plant" for intelligence of all sorts, working alongside two chiefs of ~~intelligence~~ intelligence collection who could theoretically furnish him with all the material he needed. The Assistant for Dissemination took a part also in this process, furnishing a variety of services to that end. That one product

was duplication was evident. It was equally evident that this duplication must grow rather than diminish under the circumstances.

In the midst of such a situation, it could not be surprising that the Director's duties, as originally specified, as coordinator, were all but forgotten. The system for coordination, in fact, was the only true survival of the original coordinating committee idea, for here, the Director had no independent representative, but only a coordinating committee made up of officers furnished by, and at least partially responsible to, the agencies that were to be coordinated. The failure of ICAPS was undoubtedly due primarily to its own ineptitude, but it was at least partially due to the impossible position in which ICAPS was placed as a residual survival of a system that was no longer in operation.

One other point should be mentioned which is of circumstance rather than theory. For whatever reason, Admiral Hillenkoetter did not concentrate on what General Vandenberg had considered the primary function of central intelligence: the production of the intelligence on which national policy could be based. In practical fact, of course, it was not necessary that he should do so. A persuasive case can be made out to the effect that no central agency could conscientiously begin to furnish such intelligence until it could assure itself that it had perfected a system for the acquisition of evidence complete and reliable enough to merit

drawing conclusions solid enough to support a national policy. It may have been for this reason that Hillenkoetter tended to concentrate upon problems of collection rather than those of estimate.

#### THE REORGANIZATION

The new administration in 1950 took one positive step. It returned to Vandenberg's view of the primacy of the estimative function. At the same time, it tacitly renounced the right that Vandenberg had acquired to engage in independent research. It made no attempt, however, to regain Vandenberg's position of theoretical ascendancy over the participating agencies. It might be said, in somewhat oversimplified summary, that the Smith administration returned to the "CIG" theory in so far as it was possible to return to it under vastly altered circumstances.

To go back completely would have required disbanding a very large organization that had grown up over a period of three years, or of trying in some way, to incorporate it into the IAC agency structure. Any such radical move would have been complicated, painful, and, under the circumstances of the Korean war, possibly disastrous. The ~~reason~~ immediate reason for disaster probably would have been derived from the immobilization of parts of the central intelligence agency on which the others had come to rely. In other words, whatever might have been the intentions of the new administration, a familiar process had taken place under which an organization

has grown past the point where it can be abolished even though abolition seems desirable.

The reorganization, then, might be briefly described as a system under which Central Intelligence remained a "fifth agency" which, however, proposed to operate under a "CIG" type of interdepartmental cooperative ~~exist~~ arrangement.

#### THE NEW ORGANIZATION

The key to the new organization lay in the substitution of OIC for ICAPS. ICAPS (or at least a different ICAPS) might have been an adequate means of coordination under a purely "CIG" scheme. In theory at least, for its members would have been the Director's go-betweens with the Agencies they represented and would have facilitated his work of keeping an eye on the total intelligence structure with reference to its adequacy for national purposes. The actual coordination would, of course, have been done by the Director as his own principal function. <sup>t was</sup> ~~was~~ was rendered useless when CIG became an independent agency rather than a coordinating committee.

In place of ICAPS, the new administration set up an ~~independent~~ Office, devoted to problems of coordination. Its officers were responsible only to the DCI. In other words, it <sup>had</sup> become impossible with the existence of a Central Intelligence Agency vice a coordinating committee, for the Director to give full

time to problems of coordination. He had therefore, delegated the task, not to a committee, but an individual representing himself in his coordinative capacity.

The other important organizational change was, of course, the establishment of an independent Agency ~~XXXXXX~~ Office devoted to one aspect of the intelligence-producing function: that of furnishing the intelligence on which national policy might be based. This was distinctly a step backwards toward the CIG plan. The new Office was to base its conclusions ~~XXXXXX~~ on information received from the IAC Agencies. Its emphasis was to be, not on producing intelligence that it felt justified in taking responsibility for, but upon furnishing a product that would represent the consensus of all Agencies.

A minor consequence of this move, chiefly of practical application, was the removal from the new office of all responsibility except for the production of the one type of intelligence in which it specialized. This decision necessitated the creation of new offices to undertake the production of other ~~XXXXXX~~ necessary forms of intelligence which might be grouped loosely as service of common concern. The concrete results were the establishment of an <sup>U</sup>ffice to specialize in all forms of current intelligence and another to specialize in economic research. The Office specializing in scientific intelligence, which was of the same order, was left intact.

As can easily be seen, these did not represent true changes. With the ex-

ception of a more realistic substitution for what had been ICAPS, the essential organization and concept of the CIA of 1947-1950 remained what it had been before.

B. Probable Organization required under the CIG Idea

Under this concept, the Director would have needed four assistants: one for inter-agency coordination; one for correlation and evaluation of intelligence; one for problems of dissemination, and possibly a fourth to be concerned with the Director's responsibility to protect sources and methods. (The last, however, since all actual sources and methods were under the Departments, would have been ~~xxxx~~ primarily a coordinator's function and therefore might well have been part of the first Office.) Each of these assistants would have needed a small organization of his own, which, however, would have been drawn entirely from the Departments. There would have been no need for any further organization under CIG. Such routine functions as personnel and administration ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ would have been handled by the Department s.

so far

The present history produced by this office would leave the impression on a visitor from Mars, or Congress, that the story of CIA was a continuous high-level squabble which never quite succeeded in straightening out what CIA was or where it stood with relation to the rest of the government.

This is an accurate picture but only a partial one.

It leaves largely out of consideration what was going on in the Agency while high-level committees clashed in the realm of theory vs. special interest. Whereas it is made reasonably clear that one office of the Agency was producing the final product of intelligence---estimates---amid confusion and recrimination, no one would ever know from this record that the Foreign Documents Division of OD was painfully grinding out translations of documents, some of which could very well become more important in a future emergency than the very highest-level estimate praised by the Dulles-Jackson committee, which paper stated that whereas the Russians would probably not start a war in 1948, on the other hand, they might.

There was no mention, other than in passing, of the Strategic Intelligence Division whose members were grimly engaged in the daily drudgery of assembling prosaic basic intelligence which would, nevertheless, be what military commanders and others would have to turn to in case of war rather than finely spun essays on presumed enemy intentions. There is no reference at all to the administrative branch which was, among other things, devising the complicated methods through which funds could be disbursed to make possible the collection of information without which high level estimates would have to be based on imagination only.

In Volume II, I propose to change the emphasis accordingly. Instead of having an analysis of institutional development with occasional reference to the activities and achievements of the institution, I should like to have a record of its separate parts, how they developed and why, and what they accomplished---with such an analysis of institutional evolution as seems required.

I already have a good deal of the basic information I shall need for this. Since all problems of covert security have been ruled out by fiat, purpose. /I should not anticipate much difficulty in getting the added documentary evidence I shall need. But I should like, as far as possible, to base my studies on first-hand ~~xxxxx~~ knowledge as well as documents. This would involve talking with people---not General Donovan or General Smith, but the people who do the actual work in the actual branches that produce/the actual intelligence. I should also like, if possible, to visit them in their natural habitat in order to become familiar with what they do and how they do it. Even though the end product would be their history from 1950-1953, I should be enabled to write that story in relation to reality as well as theory.

There is no implication here that one type of history is superior to another. It is ~~only~~ rather that the first has already been done. There would seem to be room now for the second which is capable, like the first, of serving a good purpose.

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SUMMARY: The essential decisions affecting the future of the Central Intelligence Agency were made under the administration of General Vandenberg in 1946. The position taken by the Smith administration implied a return to the pre-Vandenberg concept of the Agency which was, however, impracticable under the circumstances of 1950. (THE WAR, THE GOALS, NO ESSENTIAL CHANGE UNDER SMITH)

EXPLANATION

I. The idea for a Central Intelligence Group outlined in the President's directive of 22 January 1946 need not have entailed a new Agency and might, if tried, have proved a workable solution of the National Intelligence problem.

A. CIG, under this concept, would have been essentially a coordinating committee within an intelligence structure already in existence.

1. Although the Director was independent to the extent that he was appointed by the President, he was answerable to the heads of the departments of the government concerned with intelligence.

2. The Director had neither funds, personnel, nor sources of intelligence of his own; for those he was dependent on the NIA.

3. His position with respect to the NIA Agencies was that of arbiter

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B. The Director's responsibility under this concept was limited.

1. The Director was not necessarily required, under the terms of the presidential directive, to produce national intelligence estimates and take responsibility for them; he was directed only to "correlate" and "evaluate" the intelligence that the Group received from the Departments, from a supra-departmental point of view, and to ensure proper dissemination of "the resultant strategic and national policy intelligence" within the government.

SIMPLIFIED  
2. In substance, then, the Director's responsibility was ~~no more than determining what way~~ <sup>To pass judgment on</sup>, ~~and to see that~~ <sup>that</sup> LI to ~~see that~~ intelligence of national import did not escape those making national policy.

C. The CIG plan might have proved satisfactory ~~for its purpose imagined~~.

1. Assuming that the intelligence organizations within the State and military departments, as developed before the war and perfected during it, provided a means for the production of intelligence and were susceptible of expansion and improvement, it would not have been necessary to create a new organization to perform any of the functions to which they ~~were~~ accustomed, or additional functions which they would be presumed capable of adding to their duties.

-3-

(P 5<sup>o</sup>,

2. The only real need was to see that narrow departmental preoccupations did not result in failures to detect intelligence of national import, or in prevention of its distribution to all parties needing it.

3. A coordinator, with departmental assistance, would have sufficed for this purpose.

4. At a minimum, a system such as this, would have avoided the inter-agency strains and much of the expense entailed in most other plans.

II. As a result of certain decisions made under the administration of General Vandenberg, development of Central Intelligence as coordinator within the NIA became impossible, and the emergence of a quasi-independent agency was assured.

A. The most basic of these decisions derived from Vandenberg's interpretation of paragraph 3-a of the President's directive to mean that the Director must take individual responsibility for intelligence used in the formation of national policy.

B. In order to take such responsibility as this, Vandenberg considered that the Director must be able to make an independent check on the adequacy and reliability of information received by the Group from the NIA (which would, in turn, control by the Director of ~~independent~~ funds and personnel)

*(entail independent)*

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C. In taking this position, Vandenberg had declared against a coordinating group within the NIA and for an independent agency.

D. The ultimate logic of this position is far-reaching because

1. <sup>If</sup> ~~The means of checking reliability were~~ ~~could not be incomplete~~, ~~it~~  
~~were~~ the Director would always be vulnerable to that extent.

2. The only sure means of protecting the Director's full responsibility would be through the duplication of virtually the whole existing intelligence structure.

3. This being absurd, the only other logical procedure would be to subordinate the existing intelligence structure to the Director and the Central Group.

*BEGIN*

E. Such subordination ~~was~~ unobtainable; Vandenberg, ~~therefore~~, had to be content with <sup>a quasi-</sup> ~~an~~ independent group which had only a <sup>partial</sup> ~~practical~~ means of checking the reliability of information. (NOTE: The grant of authority as "Executive Agent" of the NIA implied little, if any, more power than the Director already had under the "inspection" clause in the presidential directive. What the Director could actually do under this authority would depend <sup>partly</sup> ~~very~~ on his own

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success in maneuver.) It is doubtful that the Executive Agent power would greatly have altered the history of CIA even if Hillenkoetter had retained it.)

F. As a result of Vandenberg's decisions, Admiral Hillenkoetter inherited a situation in which he ~~must~~ <sup>(COULD BE EXPRESSED TO</sup> take responsibility for "strategic and national policy intelligence" with no protection of that responsibility except a partial means of checking information through research, and through somewhat duplicative collection activities.

III. Admiral Hillenkoetter made no essential changes in the organization he had inherited despite some gestures late in his administration in the direction of full central control.

IV. The philosophy of the Smith administration implied a revival of the CIG idea.

A. This was indicated in

1. Willingness to accept limited rather than individual responsibility for "strategic and national policy intelligence."
2. Willingness to dispense with independent research.
3. The return to emphasis on the Director's duties as coordinator of the intelligence system.

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B. Although the ultimate logic of this position ~~would~~ call for a return to a coordinating committee within an existing intelligence structure, such a move would have proved impractical in 1950 even if it had been intended.

1. The terms of the Defense Act had been interpreted in the direction of an independent or quasi-independent agency.
2. The weight of precedent had tipped the balance in this direction.
3. The Agency had grown too large and its interrelationships with the rest of the intelligence structure too intricate to allow all the radical changes that a return to anything like the full CIG idea would have entailed.
4. The circumstances of the Korean War would have made such changes especially dangerous at this time.

C. Therefore, the Smith administration was left exactly where the Hillenkoetter administration had been with the exception that it did not carry on independent intelligence research, and confined its responsibility ~~to~~ that which was ~~responsible~~ possible in the absence of independent research.

V. The organizational changes introduced by the Smith administration, in order of importance, were:

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- A. The substitution of OIC for ICAPS/COAPS which implied coordination by the Director (rather than by a committee) as had been originally intended
- B. The limitation of the Office concerned with estimates and their coordination to that function alone (which necessitated establishment of other offices to superintend the other essential functions that this Office had superintended previously)
- C. The placement of training activities under a single head.

\*This listing takes into consideration the fact that we have never heard of OPC or any of its progeny.

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Definitions

Date 6/25/91

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Basic Intelligence is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. (NSCID 3, page 1)

Current Intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation. (NSCID 3, page 2)

Staff Intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities. (NSCID 3, page 2)

Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities. (NSCID 3, page 3)

National Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment. (NSCID 3, page 3)

Factual Intelligence is that intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less continuing or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. (CIG 23)

National Policy and Strategic Intelligence is that staff intelligence prepared in the interest of the national security by the Director of Central Intelligence for the President, and the State, War and Navy Departments and, as appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security. (CIG 23)

Intelligence Information is that information collected to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security. (NSCID 5, page 1)

Investigative Information is limited to that information which has been obtained (or is obtainable) by means of a security investigation. (Reg. 10-230)

National Security relates to the protection and preservation of the military, economic, and productive strength of the United States, including the security of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs, against or from espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and any and all other illegal acts designed to weaken or destroy the United States and the national intelligence effort. The term national security shall also relate to the protection of intelligence sources, methods and organization from unauthorized disclosure.

(Reg. 20-730)

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Psychological Warfare is the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims. (NIA 7)

Communications Intelligence is intelligence produced by the study of foreign communications. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Board.

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CIG

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CONTINUOUS  
SUPERVISION OVER

ORE

IMPLIED APPROPRIATE  
POWER OF SERVICES

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
IAB  
(AND ANY OTHER MILITARY)

ICAPS

ASSURES  
UNIFORM FUNCTIONING  
TOWARD THE SAME  
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*O'Neil*

**CIA PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES AND RELATED INTELLIGENCE 1946-1952**  
**(Tentative Research Outline)**

*This is a very good  
 and comprehensive  
 approach to  
 production  
 of series of  
 monographs  
 on which  
 a lot.*

**I. Planning Stage to February 1946 (For background information)**

**SOURCES:** Meetings of various bodies having to do with formation of a central intelligence agency; such notes as might be acquired from Montague, Lay, Severs and others having a direct part

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**II. The Interim Stage: The Reports Staff and Office of Research and Evaluation**

**A. Planning a coherent organization**

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**B. Recruiting personnel**

**C. Getting out summaries of current intelligence**

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**SOURCES:** Meetings of supervisory bodies; NIA and IAB records; personnel records; files of early current intelligence publications; any records that may exist of transactions within ORE; personal files

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**III. ORE Under the Intelligence Staff up to the First Reorganisation**

**A. Nature of the Contest between the Staff and the Branches**


**B. Ambiguous position of Intelligence Staff**

**C. Acceptance of Situation Report Series**

**D. Recruitment problems**

**E. Production during this period**

**F. Decisions regarding new Organisation**



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**SOURCES:** Records probably extant in various parts of RAI and elsewhere; personal records of some of those concerned; meetings of supervisory bodies; Central Records; personnel records; files of ORE publications

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IV. ORE from the First to the Second Reorganization To THE DULLES REPORT

A. Nature and Effects of First Reorganization

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B. Operations under the Reorganization

C. The "Bogota Crisis"

D. Very gradual change of emphasis from Current to Estimate intelligence

E. Added publications

F. Problems of initiation—acceptance of questionable projects

G. Problem of shaping final drafts

H. Beginning and development of coordination difficulties; attempted remedies

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I. The time factor in producing estimates; attempted remedies

J. Clashes within ORE

K. Publications during this period

L. Impact of the Dulles-Jackson Report

SOURCES: ORE records; Personal files; CIA organization charts; Central Records; Internal ORE memoranda; AD and PAP records; correspondence between Staff Intelligence and Agencies; records of coordination meetings; For Bogota affair: newspapers, congressional hearings, and internal records; ORE publications files; Dulles Report plus any records showing reasons for findings; ICAPS records; NSC and DOI directives; relevant material in IAC Agencies if available; the Hoover Report; possible interviews

I would also contact outsiders: Evans, Belford, Armstrong, possibly old timers in A-2, G-2, and ONI as well.

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## V. From the DULLES Report to the Second Reorganization

A. CDE's deliberations over meaning of Report for CDE

B. The Rebuttal

C. Formulation of Reorganization Plans

D. The "Reitman Committee" Report and other critical documents

E. NSC-50

F. CDE operations and publications during period

G. Growing conflicts in inter-agency coordination: adoption of sound recordings

H. Meeting of AD with agency colleagues to improve coordination: the impasse

I. Announcement of the "Reorganization": its nature

J. Opposition to reorganization plan; its adoption over opposition

SOURCES: CDE records; DCI and ICAPS records; IAC meetings; NSC records; Agency records if available; recordings of coordination meetings; CDE publication files; records of controversy over dissent; minutes and reports of various committees working with reorganization plans; files of Branch publications; files of miscellaneous publications and IN's.

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[Redacted]

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VI. ORE under the Second Reorganization

- A. Lack of essential change in organization or operation
- B. Functioning of the combined "Publication Division"
- C. Attempts at closer working relations with Agencies
- D. Modifications in Daily and Weekly Summaries
- E. The "Stout Committee" report
- F. Continued prevalence of dissents
- G. CIA concern over intrusion of departmental policy into intelligence
- H. Apparent plans of DCI to control situation
- I. Publications of period
- J. The Korean Crisis: ORE's record with respect to this event

SOURCES: ORE, DCI, and similar records; memoranda on matter of departmental policy; publication files; internal records, newspapers, and congressional hearings having to do with Korea.

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VII. The Third Reorganization

- A. Malfunctioning of ORE machinery under impact of Korean Crisis
- B. Resultant creation of AD's Special Staff
- C. Method of selection; composition, and theoretical functions of Staff
- D. Working out of Staff functions in practice
- E. Reason for Staff's relative failure to perform functions
- F. Achievements of Special Staff
- G. Gradual paralysis of Staff as New Order approached
- H. Effects of growing rumors on ORE in general
- I. Establishment of the New Administration

SOURCES: Principally ORE, CIA, and personal files; if possible, records of plans being made on higher levels of CIA and outside CIA for the forthcoming reorganization

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VIII. The New Order

A. Gradual transition from old to new CIA

B. Disappearance of OME and assignment of its functions to OCI, RAR and ONE

C. Nature and theory of ONE

D. Period of adjustment in ONE; gradual emergence of definite organization

E. Organization as crystallized after first year

F. ONE methods of production and coordination ||

G. ONE use of contacts outside CIA and IAC

H. Achievements of ONE through 1951

We have  
, March  
restatement  
Activities +  
Problems.

SOURCES: ONE and CIA records; ONE publication files; IAC meetings

Indicate O/S/  
fusion at some  
point also.

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## TRANSMITTAL SLIP

X2X& 2/27/52  
DATE

TO: [REDACTED]

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

## REMARKS:

Here's the outline you said  
 you would comb over. I tried to  
 leave enough space so that you can  
 add and comment to your heart's con-  
 tent and hope you will as it will con-  
 tent mine too.

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1946

*Suggest you get help of staff  
 people that have  
 been thru Clive.  
 Abbott Smith*

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This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT  
 only, for the use of DCI/HS.  
 The record copy has been  
 released to National Archives  
 under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Date 6/25/91 HRP 89-2

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CIA PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES AND RELATED INTELLIGENCE 1946-1952  
(Tentative Research Outline)

I. Planning Stage to February 1946 (For background information)

SOURCES: Meetings of various bodies having to do with formation of a central intelligence agency; such notes as might be acquired from Montague, Lay, Sowers and others having a direct part

This document has been  
approved for release through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 6/25/91  
HSP 89-2

II. The Interim Stage: The Reports Staff and Office of Research and Evaluation

A. Planning a coherent organization

B. Recruiting personnel

C. Getting out summaries of current intelligence

SOURCES: Meetings of supervisory bodies; NIA and IAB records; personnel records; files of ~~ex-~~ current intelligence publications; any records that may exist of transactions within ORE; personal files

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**III. ORE Under the Intelligence Staff up to the First Reorganization**

**A. Nature of the Contest between the Staff and the Branches**

**B. Ambiguous position of Intelligence Staff**

**C. Acceptance of Situation Report Series**

**D. Recruitment problems**

**E. Production during this period**

**F. Decisions regarding new Organization**

**SOURCES:** Records probably extant in various parts of NSA and elsewhere; personal records of some of those concerned; meetings of supervisory bodies; Central Records; personnel records; files of ORE publications.

IV. ORE from the First to the Second Reorganization TO THE DULLES REPORT

- A. Nature and Effects of First Reorganization
- B. Operations under the Reorganization
- C. The "Bogota Crisis"
- D. Very gradual change of emphasis from Current to Estimate intelligence
- E. Added publications
- F. Problems of initiation--acceptance of questionable projects
- G. Problem of shaping final drafts
- H. Beginning and development of coordination difficulties: attempted remedies
- I. The dilemma of continuing activities; attempted remedies
- J. Clashes within ORE
- K. Publications during this period
- L. Impact of the Dulles-Jackson Report

SOURCES: ORE records; Personal files; CIA organization charts; Central Records; Internal ORE memoranda; AD and P&P records; correspondence between Staff Intelligence and Agencies; records of coordination meetings; For Bogota affair: newspapers, congressional hearings, and internal records; ORE publications files; Dulles Report plus any records showing reasons for findings; ICAPS records; NSC and DCI directives; relevant material in IAC Agencies if available; the Hoover Report; possible interviews

V. From the DULLES Report to the Second Reorganization

A. OME's deliberations over meaning of Report for OME

B. The Rebuttal

C. Formulation of Reorganization Plans

D. The "Reitzel Committee" Report and other critical documents

E. NEO-50

F. OME operations and publications during period

G. Growing conflicts in inter-agency coordination; adoption of sound recordings

H. Meeting of AD with agency colleagues to improve coordination; the findings

I. Announcement of the "Reorganization"; its nature

J. Opposition to reorganization plan; its adoption over opposition

SOURCES: OME records; DOI and ICAP3 records; IAC meetings; NSC records; Agency records if available; recordings of coordination meetings; OME publication files; records of controversy over dissent; minutes and reports of various committees working with reorganization plans; files of Branch publications; files of miscellaneous publications and IM's

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- J. The Korean Crisis: ORE's record with respect to this event

SOURCES: ORE, DGT, and similar records; memoranda on matter of departmental policy; publication files; internal records, newspapers, and congressional hearings having to do with Korea.

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


## VII. The Third Reorganization

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- E. Reason for Staff's relative failure to perform functions
- F. Achievements of Special Staff
- G. Gradual paralysis of Staff as New Order approached
- H. Effects of growing rumors on ORE in general
- I. Establishment of the New Administration and how ineptly done!

SOURCES: Principally ORE, CIA, and personal files; if possible, records of plans being made on higher levels of CIA and outside CIA for the forthcoming reorganization

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**VIII. The New Order**

- A. Gradual transition from old to new CIA
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- E. Organization as crystallized after first year
- F. ONE methods of production and coordination
- G. ONE use of contacts outside CIA and IAC
- H. Achievements of ONE through 1951

SOURCES: ONE and CIA records; ONE publication files; IAC meetings

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OFFICE MESSAGE

1952?

		(DATE)
TO:		
NAME (PERSON CALLING)		<input type="checkbox"/> IN PERSON <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE
A. M.	P. M.	
TELEPHONE NO.	EXTENSION	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURNED YOUR CALL <input type="checkbox"/> WILL CALL AGAIN <input type="checkbox"/> PLEASE CALL
REMARKS:  2 - will be glad to discuss this with you. Only suggestion is that married with child - <u>VII</u> 3 <sup>rd</sup> Reorganization		
RECEIVED BY		
FORM NO. 36-9 SEP. 1946		U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-80874-1